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61

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN AGGREGATE
C O R P O R A T I O N , a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
O T T O B U E H N E R & C O M P A N Y , a[1 rv. _ lpb eAi r>nu
corporation, and P A U L B U E H N E R ,
-"
'
Defendants and Respondents,

13478

vs.
D. W . B R I M H A L L ,
Additional Defendant on
Counterclaim, and Cross-Complainant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
American Aggregate Corporation (a) on its First
Claim sued its competitor Otto Buehner & Company
and its president Paul Buehner in tort for unfair trade
practices, for conversion of 4,000 tons of plaintiff's
crushed white quartz, on which defendants had obtained from plaintiff a price quotation of $29.50 per
ton, following which defendants induced plaintiff's independent crushing contractor D . W . Brimhall to
1
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accept a purchase order in his own name to sell said
same aggregate for $20.50 per ton, then hired a carrier
to haul said materials away from plaintiff's quarry to
the Buehner plant; and (b) on the Second and Third
Claims plaintiff sued in contract and in implied contract for plaintiff's quoted price of $35.00 per ton for
1,124 additional tons obtained by defendant corporation.
D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE
I N T H E DISTRICT COURT
The trial court declined to grant plaintiff any
judicial relief under the Unfair Practices Act or for
unfair trade practices, but "found" that D . W . Brimhall, the crushing contractor, was a "joint venturer"
with plaintiff and authorized to act as "agent" for
plaintiff to accept the purchase order (in his own
name) to sell to Otto Buehner & Company at $20.50
per ton. (R. 857, Ab. 140-141). By the judgment (as
subsequently modified as to D . W . Brimhall) the
court limited plaintiff to $20.50 per ton paid to Brimhall or paid or "tendered" jointly to plaintiff and
Brimhall, denied plaintiff damages, interest or costs,
and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. (R.
854-858, 940-942, Ab. 140-144).
NATURE OF R E L I E F SOUGHT
ON A P P E A L
By Notice of Appeal plaintiff did not appeal from
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the judgment, but from
paragraphs 1 and 6 which dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice and denied plaintiff costs. Plain2
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tiff also appealed from the judgment by reason of
failure of the trial court to award plaintiff actual
damages or adequate compensation, and also failure
to award punitive damages against defendants Otto
Buehner & Company and Paul Buehner, or even interest. (R. 943-944, Ab. 144-145).
On this appeal, on its First Claim, independent of
claims for treble damages or punitive damages for
wrongful price-fixing by a competitor, and conversion
of plaintiff's aggregate, plaintiff seeks recovery in tort
for damages for the difference between what the court
allowed in the amount of only $20.50 per ton (without
consent of plaintiff which was below plaintiff's actual
costs and which below-cost figure could not legally be
contracted under the Unfair Practices Act) and plaintiff's quoted price of $29.£0 per ton. On the Second
and Third claims plaintiff seeks recovery of the difference between $20.50 per ton allowed by the court
and plaintiff's quoted price of $35.00 per ton, less hauling allowance stipulated as to portions hauled by defendants. Plaintiff also seeks recovery of interest and
costs.
STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS
For many years defendant Paul Buehner has been
president, general manager and principal stockholder
of defendant Otto Buehner & Company. No one in
that company has higher authority. During the time
in question said corporation was a competitor of plaintiff American Aggregate Corporation. Of the latter,
Richard C. Reimann is president and Don R. Reimann
is vice-president. The Buehner company also has been
3
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engaged in the cast stone manufacturing business, and
has been a competitor of Style Crete, Inc., in such a
business. Don R. Reimann has been president of the
latter. (R. 27-28, 328, Ab. 4, 40, 41).
Since June 1, 1966, plaintiff has been the lessee of
mining claims in Section 21, T. 13 N., R. 16 W., S L M ,
Box Elder County. (R. 16-18, Ab. 2). From those
mining claims and the quarry thereon, for some years
there has been produced a "milk-white quartz" known
as Park Valley white quatrz. The crushed quartz aggregate from said property has been used in a number
of buildings in several States, some by defendant corporation. Some other milk-white quartz is located in
Virginia. (R. 28, Ab. 4). Plaintiff's officers and employees did a considerable amount of work at said
quarry. Richard C. Reimann did the mining and
crushing. I n 1967 D . W . Brimhall, an independent
crushing contractor, orally agreed to do the mining and
crushing for plaintiff at his convenience, and be paid
$10 a ton when the aggregate was sold. The $10 per
ton included mining, moving equipment, crushing, depreciation, and his anticipated profit. (R. 209, 214216, 250, 278-279, 333-335, 566-568, 605-606, 620, Ab.
27-29, 33, 36, 41-42, 80, 86-87, 89-90, 93).
In 1967 and 1968 Otto Buehner & Company purchased this type of white quartz from plaintiff at the
regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 30-31, Ab. 4). The
aggregate mined and crushed by plaintiff in 1966 and
1967, plus the aggregate mined and crushed by D . W .
Brimhall for plaintiff starting in 1967, was segregated
into stock piles. In 1969 the crushed Park Valley white
quartz was specified as the aggregate for the cast stone
for the new Church Office building in Salt Lake City.
4
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( R . 33-37, A b . 5 ) . P a u l Buehner before bidding on
the j o b asked D o n R . Reimann, vice-president of plaintiff for a price quotation on 3,500 t o 4,000 tons of the
specified white quartz aggregate, and was given a
quotation of $29.50 a ton delivered, which was the same
price for t h a t quantity for all prospective users. After
Otto Buehner & Company was awarded the cast stone
contract, Buehner again asked for a quotation, and he
was given the identical quotation of $29.50 a ton. Buehner then said t h a t was "too high." H e said, " I can get
the same material or similar material for around $19.50
a t o n " from a man named Chidester. Reimann said,
"they couldn't get t h a t material unless they stole it
from us. I t was specified on the j o b . " Buehner then
said he could substitute other material, but D o n Reim a n n said he talked t o the architect and there would
not be any substitution. H e refused t o change the
quotation. (R. 335-339, A b . 42-43).
Buehner took D . W . Brimhall, the crushing contractor, with him t o look at some other properties and
invited him t o contract crushing. They then went t o
the American A g g r e g a t e quarry. Brimhall showed
Buehner the stock piles and told him American A g g r e gate had quoted $29.50 a ton for 4,000 t o n s ; but
Buehner said he would not pay t h a t much for those
materials. (R. 216-220, A b . 29-30). P a u l Buehner
testified t h a t he told Brimhall t h a t the American A g gregate price was too high, and t h a t they would have
to come down; t h a t "if I didn't get it at my price I was
going t o substitute some other material." H e said he
had Brimhall go back and forth t o American A g g r e g a t e
several times . Buehner told Brimhall t o tell D o n Reim a n n t h a t the price was too high; and t h a t he had
5
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better lower the figure. Buehner testified that he asked
Brimhall to talk to Don and Rich Reimann and see
if they would lower the price. (R. 44-48, Ab. 6-7).
Buehner then told Brimhall that he planned to take
all sizes known as "crusher run". When Brimhall returned with a quotation from American Aggregate of
$25.50 a ton for "crusher run", and said it was the
lowest price American Aggregate would take, Buehner
said, "No deal." H e told Brimhall he could make a
deal with Chidester for material just as good at $19.50
a ton delivered, although Buehner knew Chidester then
did not have a quarry opened up. (R. 49-50, 140-142,
Ab. 7, 19).
Buehner testified he had several conversations with
Brimhall stating that Buehners planned to take crusher
run. H e said he knew American Aggregate was to
pay something for crushing, but he did not know what
the agreement was with D . W . Brimhall. (R. 142143, Ab. 19). Brimhall said he told Buehner the Reimanns would not go below $25.50 a ton for crusher
run; that it was their bottom figure; and also that Don
Reimann might have said that they could not go below
that figure without "going in the red". Brimhall said
he told Buehner that was a fair figure for crusher run.
H e stated that Buehner then said if he could not get
the material at his price he was "going to have a substitution." (R. 221-222, 240-244. H e also said that
Buehner told him if he did not sign a purchase order
Buehner was going to give Chidester a contract; that
Paul Buehner offered him $20.50 a ton plus $5,000
"move-in-cost", and he signed acceptance of Exhibit
19-P (the Purchase order dated October 17, 1969),
soon afterwards. H e said he signed acceptance based

6
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on the understanding that Buehners were going to take
"crusher run", but as shown by Exhibit 20-P the said
purchase order was for selected sizes, not for crusher
run. (B. 222-225, 608-610, 632, Ab. 30, 88, 92). Said
Exhibit 19-P was issued only in the name of D . W .
Brimhall personally. (See Ab. 110-111). American
Aggregate Corporation was not even mentioned.
Paul Buehner never sent American Aggregate a
copy of that purchase order. (B. 147, Ab. 20). Nor
did Brimhall send a copy. According to Buehner, his
company already had issued a purchase order to John
Chidester, October 6, 1969, dated 11-6-69 for a "minimum of 4,000 tons of Park Valley quartz" at $20 a
ton, Exhibit 15-D. (B. 554, Ab. 78, 108). However,
that order was canceled within a relatively few days
without any compensation either just before or shortly
after Brimhall signed acceptance of Exhibit 19-P and
20-P. (B. 103A, 554, Ab. 14, 78). Early in November
1969, Brimhall called plaintiff and said Buehners were
going to accept the rock from American Aggregate
quarry. Plaintiff knew defendants had no choice, as
that was the aggregate specified. (B. 345-346, Ab. 44).
Plaintiff's quotation of $29.50 a ton included the
hauling to the Buehner plant. Plaintiff had reserved
the right to do its own hauling. Brimhall told Don
Beimann it was impossible for plantiff to deliver all
the materials before the end of the year, but to start
hauling. Plaintiff started to haul November 15, 1969,
but Buehner's plant superintended Marvin L. AUred
testified he told one of the drivers to stop because there
was no room in the bins. (B. 345-349, 468, 485, Ab.
44-45, 65, 69). Undisclosed to plaintiff was the issuance
on November 11, 1969, of a purchase order from Otto
7
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Buehner & Company to Clrak Tank Lines, Exhibit
5-D, for "Delivery of approximately 4,000 tons finished Aggregate Park Valley quartz to Otto Buehner
Company bins." Instructions as to sizes were given
each day by Mr. Allred to drivers. (R. 52-58, Ab. 7-8).
When plaintiff failed to receive a purchase order
by December, plaintiff telephoned for Paul Buehner
later in the month. Unable to reach him, he was referred
to someone else. Don Reimann asked "when the purchase order was coming" on the Park Valley white
quartz. The man at Buehners said, "We have made
an agreement with Mr. Brimhall. See him about it."
Since there was royalty payable at $1.50 a ton with a
rquirement for weight slips and accounting monthly
showing what had gone out of the quarry, lessor John
W . Rigby came in several times demanding weigh slips
and payment. Attempts to reach Brimhall were unsuccessful, until January. (R. 349-353, Ab. 45-46).
When Don Reimann reached him about January 12,
1970, Brimhall said, " I am afraid I have done something wrong, but I can't talk about it now. I am
going on vacation." H e refused to meet until he returned. (R. 353-357, 448-449, Ab. 45-47, 61). January 23, 1970, plaintiff received from Brimhall a check
for $1,954.41, Exhibit 44-P with notation "royalty
Park Valley quartz, 1,302.94 tons." Along with it was
a list of November shipments Exhibit 43-P. (R. 450451, Ab. 61, 127-128).
After unsuccessful efforts to reach Paul Buehner,
Richard C. Reimann talked to the office manager of
Otto Buehner & Company, about February 15, 1970,
and asked when plaintiff was going to receive payment
on the aggregate. Said Buehner office manager replied,

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"You are not going to get paid." (R. 451-453, Ab. 6162). Don R. Reimann called Clark Tank Lines, talked
to H a l Barker and said, " I want you to stop the hauling right now." Barker told him to "go to hell," and
said that company had a contract with Buehners. (R.
372-378, Ab. 49-50). Brimhall returned in March,
1970, and after weeks of delay, plaintiff obtained a
meeting during the latter part of April or first of
May 1970. Before that meeting Buehner called Brimhall and said he anticipated needing another MB 700
tons of aggregate. Brimhall testified: " I informed
him at this time that I had already overstepped my
bounds with American Aggregate and that I had
problems, and he would have to negotiate this with
American Aggregate." Brimhall said any additional
material would "have to be at a different quote." (R.
232-233, 291-293, Ab. 31-32, 37).
At the meeting held the last of April or first of
May 1970 between Richard C. Reimann, Don R. Reimann, officers of plaintiff, Paul Buehner, president
of Otto Buehner & Company, and D . W . Brimhall,
"there were some pretty hot words uttered". (R. 286,
Ab. 37). Brimhall was apologetic, said he was sure he
had done something wrong he felt sorry for; but the
Reimanns said they wanted to know what happened.
Paul Buehner produced Exhibit 19-P, and asked
American Aggregate to sign it, but the Reimanns refused. Don said it was not made to American Aggregate; that under no condition would he sign that purchase order "because we never quoted that price. I t
will be below our cost and we'll not sign it." The Reimanns never previously had seen Exhibit 19-P. Don
Reimann asked Buehner if he was going to make up
the difference. H e said he would not; that he had a
9
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"bona fide purchase order with Brimhall," and he was
going to hold Brimhall to it; and if any difference had
to be made up Brimhall would have to pay the difference. When Brimhall was asked if he could make up
the difference, he said he couldn't; that it would break
him. Buehner then said, "you made plenty of money
at this lower figure. I don't know why you want any
more." Don Reimann said Buehner had "a lot of guts
to come in here and tell us how much we can make."
Rich Reimann asked Buehner if he allowed his janitor
to sign purchase orders, but Buehner did not answer.
(R. 153, 154, 358-360, Ab. 20-21, 57). One of the Reimanns said plaintiff could not sell the rock at $20.50
a ton "because it's below our cost." (R. 453-458, Ab.
62-63).
After the Reimanns withdrew and conferred, Don
Reimann then said: Under certain conditions "we
would not bring suit against Buehner." There were
four conditions specified: (1) "We had to have weigh
tickets monthly." (2) "We had to have an accounting
of payments monthly up to date." (3) "The money
had to be paid to American Aggregate." (4) Under
no condition was any more than 4,000 tons to be taken
out of that quarry, and if it was, it had to be paid at
the full price of $35 a ton." The accounting had to be
made every month so plaintiff could settle with lessors
on royalty. (R. 362-363, Ab. 48). Brimhall's version
was that "Don said they would not sue if they got a
proper accounting each month, copies of weigh tickets,
and payment each month." H e said he didn't deny that
Don stated that if any material in excess of 4,000 tons
was taken, it would be at the rate of $35 a ton. (R.
234, Ab. 32). Paul Buehner testified, "We did all of
10
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those conditions", but declined to state any specifics,
(R. 147, 151-152, Ab. 20). H e said he knew American
Aggregate claimed ownership of the materials shipped
to Otto Buehner & Company. (R. 153, Ab. 21).
Buehner said he promised copies of all weigh tickets
and said "we have done that." When asked for proof,
he said he did not handle those matters. (R. 156, Ab.
21).
Defendants never furnished plaintiff copies of
weigh tickets nor rendered any monthly accounting.
(R. 363, Ab. 48). After repeated requests for weigh
tickets and accounting Buehner merely sent a letter
June 16, 1970, Exhibit 25-P. I t disclosed for the first
time that Buehners already had paid Brimhall $23,185.78 as of May 31, 1970. (R. 364, Ab. 48). Otto
Buehner & Company never even paid Brimhall every
30 days to comply with Exhibit 19-P. Plaintiff attempted to get weigh tickets and accounting information from defendants as well as from Clark Tank Lines
and Christensen Feed & Seed; but the information was
inaccurate and far short of the actual amounts shipped.
Exhibit 7-P sent by Christensen reported only 2,625.59
tons. Even the "corrected report", Exhibit 21-P showed
only a total of 3,179 tons. Exhibit 21-P from Clark
Tank Lines showed a total of only 2,429.78 tons, later
admitted to be more than 50% short. (Ab. 103-104,
112-114, 119-121). I t took over a year for plaintiffs
counsel to get Exhibit 24-P, sent shortly prior to filing
suit. By it Buehners actually admitted receiving 4,913.98 tons (exclusive of what plaintiff had delivered
by request, aggregating 259 tons). No payment was
ever made directly to plaintiff. Buehners merely added
the name of plaintiff to the checks it sent Brimhall
11
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after June 28, 1970. Nor were any of the other four
conditions complied with for refraining from filing suit.
(R. 367-371, 461-467, Ab. 49-51, 64-65).
About the first part of June 1970, Paul Buehner
called Richard C. Reimann and said he needed several
hundred more tons for another job. Reimann quoted
Buehner the regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 459-460,
Ab. 63). About the same time, Marv Allred, Otto
Buehner & Company plant superintendent, called Don
R. Reimann and also asked for a price for quartz aggregate. H e also was quoted $35 a ton, which was the
same price charged in 1967 and 1968. Buehners did
not issue any purchase order, but plaintiff discovered
that its aggregate continuedto be hauled away from
the quarry by Clark Tank Lines or Christensen Feed
& Seed to the Buehner plant. (R. 367, Ab. 48-49).
The billing dated December 31, 1970, for additional aggregate was ignored by Buehners, Exhibit 27-P (Ab.
118). After plaintiff's attorney by letter dated May
8, 1971, to Otto Buehner & Company indicated suit
was going to be filed, the Buehner company sent Brimhall a check for some "additional aggregate", Brimhall returned the check as stated in his letter July 28,
1971, in response to letter from Thomas A. Duff in
dated June 17, 1971, Exhibit 34-P. (R. 291-298, Ab.
37, 125). See Appendix B. Brimhall stated he had no
authority to quote a price on material for any other
job. At the trial it was proved by Marvin Allred that
the shortage of materials complained of was due to the
fact that Buehners diverted some of the aggregate for
the Church Office Building job to an entirely different
job. (R. 485-486, 494-495, Ab. 68-70).
On July 9, 1970, after Brimhall made certain dis12
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closures to plaintiff he offered settlement and requested that he not be made a defendant in the litigation with the Buehners. (R. 620-635, Ab. 90-92, 142144).
ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
T H E "FINDING'' T H A T D. W. B R I M H A L L
WAS A "JOINT VENTURER'' W I T H PLAINT I F F "AND AS SUCH" W A S "AGENT'' FOR
P L A I N T I F F TO E N T E R I N T O A P U R C H A S E
ORDER AGREEMENT, WAS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR;
FOR
BRIMHALL
ADMITTED
T H A T H E O P E R A T E D AS AN I N D E P E N D E N T L I C E N S E D C R U S H I N G CONTRACTOR
T O B E P A I D A F L A T C H A R G E O F $10 P E R
T O N F O R M I N I N G A N D C R U S H I N G SERVICES P E R F O R M E D AT H I S OWN CONVENIENCE, W I T H O U T SHARING LOSSES W I T H
PLAINTIFF; AND H E ACTED ADVERSELY
TO P L A I N T I F F I N A C C E P T I N G A PURCHASE ORDER FROM A COMPETITOR IN
H I S OWN N A M E TO S E L L P L A I N T I F F ' S
A G G R E G A T E B E L O W P L A I N T I F F ' S QUOTE D PRICES, AND I L L E G A L L Y AT DEFENDANTS' DICTATED PRICE BELOW
P L A I N T I F F ' S COSTS.
Plaintiff did not join D . W . Brimhall as a defendant, for he convinced plaintiff in a meeting in 1971
that the reason he signed the "Brimhall purchase order"
Exhibit 19-P, was because Paul Buehner put a lot of
pressure on him to sign it, in a way of business dealing.
(R. 211, Ab. 28). Brimhall testified that Paul Buehner
13
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told him that if he did not sign a purchase order,
Buehner was going to give Chidester a contract; and
Brimhall signed soon after. (R. 612, Ab. 92).
No relief is sought against D . W . Brimhall on
this appeal, inasmuch as the trial court amended paragraphs 4 and 5 of the conclusions of law and paragraphs
4 and 5 of the judgment, to conform to the settlement
agreement he made with plaintiff in July 1970. (R.
620-635, Ab. 90-92, 142-144).
D . W . Brimhall admitted that he never was on
the payroll of American Aggregate Corporation. H e
testified that from 1960 to 1971 he was a licensed contractor operating on his own, doing custom work for
various people having crushing work to do, State highway contracts, etc; extending over quite an area in
Utah. (R. 237, Ab. 32). Operating as a general contractor he did custom crushing of all types of materials,
including quartz, some for American Aggregate. H e
said crushing this type of material was being done for
$7 a ton. (R. 215, Ab. 29). However, he later testified
that the reasonable cost of crushing 1,000 tons of jumbo
size Park Valley quartz down to number 2 size, at the
Buehner Plant would range from $2 to $5 a ton, and
could be in the range of $4. (R. 640, Ab. 93). H e
testified that on occasion he had gone to the landowner
and made arrangements for crushing aggregate to
stockpile it and to hold for future sale, which prompted
him about 1967 to make an arrangement with American
Aggregate to move into its quarry in Park Valley and
crush aggregate there. (R. 566-568, Ab. 80). H e
entered into an oral agreement with American Aggregate. (R. 209, Ab. 27). H e said he had the privilege
14
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of moving in any time and crushing when convenient,
at his own expense. (R. 612-613, Ab. 89).
Brimhall also testified he was to receive $10 a ton
when the material was sold. (R. 250, Ab. 33). On deposition October 5, 1971, he testified: " I would receive
$10 a ton for my effort in preparing the material."
That included "whatever was necessary to get it into
a finished product", including removing overburden,
mining, crushing, moving equipment, wear on equipment, etc. (R. 214-216, Ab. 28). H e admitted that
the $10 a ton figure included his anticipated profit.
(R. 605-606, Ab. 86-87). H e admitted also that plaintiff never paid him anything in excess of $10 a ton. (R.
620, Ab. 90). His arrangement was that he was to be
paid when the sale was made and the money was collected by American Aggregate. H e did not know of a
single instance when he was not paid that way. (R.
278-279, Ab. 36). The check dated January 31, 1968,
for $3,765.39, Exhibit 51-P was based on tonnage sold.
(R. 601-604, Ab. 86). As to losses, if any occurred,
"we would have to be responsible for our own particular
operation." (R. 571, Ab. 81).
I t was stipulated that plaintiff's lessors had good
title to the quarry in Section 21, T. 13 N., R. 16 W.,
SLM. Leases to plaintiff were dated June 1, 1966,
and 1971. (R. 16-18, Ab. 2). During the summer of
1969 Paul Buehner took Brimhall with him to look at
some property 18 to 20 miles from the American Aggregate leasehold. Buehner invited him to contract
crushing. They then went over to the American Aggregate property. Brimhall said he told Buehner he
was to receive $10 per ton from American Aggregate.
Brimhall said he told Buehner his relation with Ameri-
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can Aggregate, "That they owned the pit and the operation, and my involvement with them was strictly on
a crushing preparation." Buehner looked at the stockpiles. There were between 3,000 tons and 4,000 tons
in stockpiles, each size in a different pile. (R. 216220, Ab. 29-30). Brimhall also told Buehner that
American Aggregate had quoted a figure of $29.50 a
ton for 4,000 tons. At one time Paul Buehner told
Brimhall that he would not pay that amount of money
for those materials. (R. 220, Ab. 30).
Brimhall said he had a number of meetings with
Buehner and tried to negotiate between American Aggregate and Otto Buehner Company. When Buehner
told Brimhall he was going to take "crusher run", Brimhall went back to Rich and Don Reimann (president
and vice-president of American Aggregate) for a
price quotation on "crusher run." Brimhall testified
that the Reimanns quoted a figure of $25.50 for
"crusher run" for all sizes of materials, before October
17, 1969; and that American Aggregate would not go
below $25.50 per ton; that it was their bottom figure;
and that Don Reimann might have said that they could
not go below $25 a ton without going in the red. (R.
240-244, Ab. 32-33).
Brimhall reported back to Buehner that American
Aggregate would not go below $25.50 per ton. H e
admitted that the Reimanns did not give any permission to go below the $25.50 a ton figure. (R. 242, Ab.
32-33). Brimhall testified that when he went back to
Buehner he said that $25.50 a ton was a fair figure for
crusher run. Paul Buehner then said, "No deal." H e
said he could get material "just as good" at a lower
figure; and that if he couldn't get this material at his
16
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price, that he was going to have a substitution.
222, A b . 3 0 ) .

(R. 221-

Brimhall admitted that the Reimanns never said,
" D o the best you can"; that he told Buehner that the
Reimanns would not consider anything less t h a n $25.50
a ton, and that Brimhall said it was fair, considering
costs. Buehner then offered Brimhall $20.50 a ton plus
$5,000 "move-in" if he would sign a purchase order.
H e said accepted immediately on the basis that Buehners would take all sizes. Brimhall said he did not recall
telling plaintiff that Buehner was going to pay him
$5,000 t o "move-in." H e said he stated definitely t o
P a u l Buehner t h a t American Aggregate would not go
below $25.50 for crusher run. (R. 608-610, A b . 8 8 ) .
Brimhall testified t h a t he did not tell P a u l Buehner
that he was an officer to sign any contracts for American Aggregate. W h e n Exhibit 19-P was presented to
him by Buehners he was conscious of the fact that it
did not contain the name of American A g g r e g a t e Corporation at all. (Ab. 110-111). H e knew American
Aggregate had quoted $29.50 a ton for selected sizes,
and t h a t Otto Buehner & Company did not take all of
the sizes; and t h a t he signed Exhibit 20-P designating
particular sizes. (R. 222-224, A b . 3 0 ) .
Brimhall said he told Buehner t h a t American A g gregate had a lease on the quarry. H e did not deny
t h a t he told Buehner t h a t American A g g r e g a t e owned
the materials at the quarry. (R. 225, A b . 3 0 ) . H e said
t h a t P a u l Buehner told him t h a t he was going to give
Chidester a contract if Brimhall did not sign the purchase order, and t h a t he signed soon after that. ( R .
632, A b . 9 2 ) .
Defendant P a u l Buehner, called as an adverse wit17
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ness, admitted that he knew that Park Valley white
quartz was specified as the aggregate for the cast stone
for the new Church Office Building in Salt Lake City;
that the samples approved by the architects had been
taken out of the American Aggregate quarry; and the
mock-up for the architects was made of this approved
material, and not taken from any adjoining land or any
other place. (R. 33-37, Ab. 5).
Buehner admitted that on deposition he testified
that when Brimhall mentioned American Aggregate's
quotation, he told Brimhall that the "price was too
high" and that he had better tell Don Reimann that the
price was too high and "to lower the figure." H e said
he asked Brimhall to talk to Don and Rich Reimann
to see if they would lower the figure. After some discussions, Buehner told Brimhall that Buehners planned
to take all sizes or what was known as crusher run;
that it would make considerable difference with the
Reimanns in the quotation. When American Aggregate then quoted $25.50 a ton for "crusher run",
Buehner told Brimhall, "No deal." Buehner knew that
there was no other quarry opened up, but he told Brimhall he could make a deal with Chidester for "material
just as good" for $19.50 a ton delivered. (R. 48-50,
Ab. 6-7).
Don R. Reimann, vice-president of American Aggregate, testified that when American Aggregate took
over the quarry in 1966, it was hazardous. The road
into it was very narrow, and considerable work had to
be done . H e and other men worked there for the corporation. His brother Richard (Rich) worked there
many days, doing the mining and crushing. In 1967
Brimhall told them he could do the crushing easier be1S
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cause he had much larger equipment; that he would
crush the material at his convenience and be paid $10
a ton when American Aggregate sold the material and
received the money. (R. 333-335, Ab. 41-42). Brimhall agreed to that, and they operated on that basis.
(R. 331-335, Ab. 41-42).
During the summer of 1969 Paul Buehner met with
Don, and said "Your quartz is specified on this job"
referring to the Church Office Building job. Don told
Paul the price always had been $35 a ton, but Paul
Buehner asked for quotation on a large quantity. On
3,500 to 4,000 tons Don quoted $29.50 a ton delivered.
That quotation was not made exclusively for Otto
Buehner & Company, but for everyone. (R. 334-335,
Ab. 42). I n September 1969 after Otto Buehner &
Company was awarded the cast stone contract, Paul
Buehner again asked Don R. Reimann for a quotation,
and Don again quoted $29.50 a ton for that same tonnage, which was the same quotation to everyone for
that quantity. (R. 336-337, Ab. 42). Buehner said it
was "too high." H e falsely represented he could purchase that same material or similar material from a man
named Chidester for $19.50 a ton. " I said they couldn't
get that material unless they stole it from us. I t was
specified on the job." Paul Buehner also said they
could substitute materials, but Don Reimann said he
talked to the architect and was told they would not
allow any substitutions. (R. 337-339, Ab. 42-43).
When Brimhall came to American Aggregate and
said it would have to knock the price down, because
Buehners claimed they could get the material cheaper
from another source, American Aggregate refused to
lower its quotation. Later Brimhall came back and
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asked Don and Rich Reimann if they would lower
their price if Buehners took "crusher run" which is
everything that comes from the crusher without segregation into stockpiles. American Aggregate then told
Brimhall it would sell the aggregate at $25.50 for
"crusher run", but under no condition would it sell
under that figure. (R. 340-344, Ab. 43). Obviously,
Brimhall conveyed the message and that message came
through to Paul Buehner and his corporation loudly
and clearly that the Buehners were not going to dictate prices of their competitors. American Aggregate
knew that its aggregate had been specified and that no
one else had that kind of material, so there was no need
to meet a price on some inferior unspecified and unacceptable material. Paul Buehner then proceeded to
work on Brimhall, the crushing contractor, to pressure
him into agreeing to sell plaintiff's aggregate at a
figure below plaintiff's costs behind the backs of plaintiff's officers.
I t is obvious that there was no "joint venture"
agreement between American Aggregate and its crushing contractor, D . W . Brimhall. This Court has held
repeatedly that under Utah law a joint venture is a
partnership generally limited to a single transaction.
Forbes v. Butler, 66 Utah 373, 242 P . 950, 946. In
Koumans v. White Star Gas k Oil Co., 92 Utah 24,
63 P.2d 231 it was held that a joint venture is subject to
the law of partnership. I n Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah
165, 239 P . 2d 749, it was held that a joint venture,
being in the nature of a partnership, cannot arise except
by consent of the parties under an agreement to share
profits and losses. Brimhall expressly disclaimed any
duty to share any losses of plaintiff. H e testified that
20
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he was to get $10 a ton when the aggregate was sold
and American Aggregate collected the money. H e
charged a very substantial premium of $3 a ton over the
general price of $7 a ton for those crushing services in
that area, and it should be remembered that contractors
doing the same j o b at $7 a ton were expecting the $7
a ton to net them a profit, or they would not have
been engaged in that kind of business. F o r whatever
delay might occur, Brimhall was not only getting the
profit on $7 a ton, when he said crushing actually cost
from $2 to $5 a ton, but also taking a profit of $3 for
the delay period which would be equivalent to 25% interest a year. T h e claim that he should get a profit
"over the $10" was not mentioned until after suit was
started, nor months after. Brimhall talked American
Aggregate into omitting him as a defendant in the lawsuit. Brimhall's fee for everything he did was a flat
charge of $10 a ton. H e did not have to share any loss
American A g g r e g a t e might have to suffer. According to his testimony he explained to P a u l Buehner
that he was to get $10 a ton.
Section 48-1-3, U . C. A . 1953, Uniform P a r t n e r ship A c t (which has been judicially applied to "joint
ventures"), specifies:
" A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit."
A s pointed out in Stillwell v. Trutanich, 3 Cal.
R p t r . 285, 288, 178 C. A . 2d 614, in a joint venture the
parties not only share in the profits, but also in the
losses. Brimhall made it clear that he was to get $10
a ton although it involved a considerable profit. T h a t
was for himself. H e also said that if there were losses,
21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

each one would take care of that on his own operations,
so he demonstrated there was no joint venture. There
was no agreement to share either losses or profits between plaintiff and Brimhall. Brimhall had his own
separate business as a licensed independent contractor
doing custom crushing for a number of parties. H e had
his own machinery and equipment. H e also had his own
employees. Plaintiff had no ownership interest in his
business. Brimhall told Buehner that American Aggregate owned the quarry, and the materials at the
quarry. Brimhall was not on American Aggregate
payroll. H e admitted he had no authority to sign any
contracts for American Aggregate. Brimhall certainly
was not a co-owner of the aggregate business.
Under the provisions of Section 48-1-6, even if a
partnership or joint venture exists, a partner or joint
venturer can act as an agent to bind the partnership or
joint venture if he executes a document in the partnership name or joint venture name. A partner or joint
venturer cannot bind the partnership or joint venture
by merely signing some document in his individual
name. Exhibits 19-P and 20-P (Ab. 110-111), were
issued by Otto Buehner & Company to D. W. Brimhall personally. They did not purport to be issued to
any joint venture as defendant tried to torture the instruments to read by violation of the Parol Evidence
Rule. Nor did Brimhall purport to sign for American
Aggregate Corporation. If Paul Buehner had honestly
believed (which he did not) that Brimhall was engaged
in a joint venture with American Aggregate with
authority to sign for American Aggregate, he would
not have neglected to have Brimhall sign for American
Aggregate Corporation.
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N o purchase order could have been signed in the
name of a joint venture, because none ever came into
existence. W h e n defendants prepared Exhibits 19-P
and 20-P, they did not thereby pretend that plaintiff
was p a r t of a "joint venture." Those two exhibits did
not even mention American Aggregate Corporation
nor even refer to it, nor provide for it to receive any
p a r t of the fraudulent sale price for Plaintiff's materials. The $5,000 illegal inducement to Brimhall t o
accept the purchase order from Otto Buehner & Company to sell plaintiff's goods below plaintiff's costs,
under the pious label of "move-in-costs", obviously wTas
not payable to plaintiff. Buehner admittedly never sent
plaintiff a copy of Exhibit 19-P and 20-P because that
would have exposed the fraud being perpetrated on
plaintiff. (The $10 a ton payable by plaintiff to Brimhall when the aggregate was sold, included moving in
and out of the p r o p e r t y ) . Defendants Buehner knew
they had to have the materials out of the plaintiff's
quarry, for that was the only place defendants knew
that the milk-white quartz specified for the Church
Office Building j o b could be obtained, except in Virginia. (R. 28, A b . 4 ) .
The trial court made a finding of "agency" of
Brimhall based solely on the erroneous finding that
there was a "joint venture". There was no joint venture
because Brimhall was t o receive a fixed price of $10 a
ton when the aggregate was sold and plaintiff collected
the money, and he was not to share any loss with plaintiff. Consequently, there was no agency. However, if
there had been a joint venture, the purchase order
would have had to be signed in the name of the joint
venture in order to bind plaintiff, not in the name of
Brimhall alone.
23
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Brimhall had no authority to execute any purchase
order on behalf of plaintiff. Exhibit 19-P does not
purport to be executed for or on behalf of the plaintiff,
since it does not even refer to plaintiff. Consequently,
when defendants raised defenses of "agency" and also
pretended that plaintiff "approved" the Brimhall "purchase order", plaintiff interposed by affirmative defenses, motions and objections, (a) the Statute of
Frauds, and (b) the attempt to vary and contradict the
express terms of Exhibit 19-P by parol evidence. (R.
734, 739, 839-842). The trial court first deferred ruling thereon, then ruled in effect against the plaintiff by
findings of fact. The court erred prejudicially by such
adverse rulings and findings, when plaintiff's name was
not even mentioned on Exhibit 19-P. The findings
amount to a unilateral amendment of said document
against the will of plaintiff which was the injured party.
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff had made Brimhall an agent (which plaintiff did not do), plaintiff by
its officers had the sole right to fix prices for its materials. Plaintiff quoted defendants prices of $29.50 a
ton for milk white quartz of selected sizes, and $25.50
a ton for "crusher run". Brimhall knew that plaintiff
refused to go below those prices, and Brimhall told
Paul Buehner that plaintiff would not lower its prices.
Since defendants knew that plaintiff had refused to go
below those prices, if Brimhall had signed acceptance of
a purchase order in the name of plaintiff, when he had
no authority to sign any contracts, he would have been
acting adversely to his principal, and acting outside the
scope of his authority particularly if he had signed a
contract to sell for less than plaintiff's quoted prices.
An agent has no authority to overrule his principal nor
defy his principal's lawful decisions.
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However, Brimhall did not act as an "agent" of
plaintiff in signing Exhibits 19-P and 20-P in his own
name at the request of defendants in spite of Buehners'
false representations that they were going to take
"crusher run". If Brimhall was acting as an agent for
anyone, he was acting as an agent or tool or instrumentality for a competitor of plaintiff and to the detriment of plaintiff. Paul Buehner admitted under oath
that after he received plaintiff's price quotation of
$29.50 a ton for selected sizes, he said he would not pay
that much for those materials, and inferentially that
he was going to dictate plaintiff's prices, knowing that
Otto Buehner & Company had to have plaintiff's milk
white quartz aggregate for the cast stone because it was
specified, and the architects would not allow any substitution. Buehner not only told Brimhall to tell plaintiff's officers Rich and Don Reimann that their price
was "too high", but he told Brimhall to tell them they
would have to lower the prices, and that if he could not
buy the material at his price, he would substitute some
other materials. (R. 45, Ab. 6). Buehner thereby
threatened to cheat and defraud The Church as owner
of the building project and the prime contractors.
Buehner knew he had no right to dictate the prices of
a competitor, nor to substitute unspecified materials.
Then Buehner, as he admitted under oath "had Mr.
Brimhall go back and forth to American Aggregate
Corporation several times." (R. 45, Ab. 6). For whose
benefit? Certainly not for plaintiff. Buehner then
falsely represented that his company was willing to
take "crusher run", and he told Brimhall "to find out
what kind of a quote" plaintiff's officers would give on
"crusher run." When Brimhall came back with a quot-
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ation from plaintiff of $25.50 a ton for "crusher run",
with the message that plaintiff would not accept anything less, Buehner arrogantly declared, "No deal."
Buehner knew then that plaintiff would not accept a
purchase order at a price lower than plaintiff's quotations, so the Buehners decided to circumvent plaintiff
altogether by working on Brimhall to induce him not
merely to accept in his own name behind the backs of
plaintiff's officers a purchase order for less than plaintiff's quoted prices, but at defendants' dictated price
of $20.50 which was below plaintiff's costs.
Although the court repeatedly sustained objections
to attempts to prove the total amount of plaintiff's costs,
Brimhall himself testified that among the costs were,
$10 a ton to himself when the aggregate was sold, $1.50
royalty per ton, and $8 a ton estimated hauling charge
to Salt Lake City. Said three items alone totaled $19.50
per ton or only $1 a ton less than the sale price in Brimhall's purchase order. The following additional costs
and expenses chargeable to the cost of the aggregate
obviously would raise the total costs to at least $4 or $5
above the $20.50 figure dictated by the Buehners: (a)
salaries and wages of officers and employees of plaintiff, (b) employer taxes ,(c) thousands of dollars spent
to meet the safety requirements of the Industrial Commission, (d) depreciation on plaintiff's machinery and
equipment used at the quarry, (e) cost of operation of
such equipment while at the quarry, (f) annual local
taxes on machinery and equipment at the quarry, (g)
accounting fees and record keeping, (h) legal fees, and
(i) miscellaneous costs.
The trial court committed prejudicial error in disregarding the facts and the law by finding and con26
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eluding that Brimhall was a "joint venturer with the
plaintiff" and "as such was authorized to act as an
agent for" plaintiff and to "enter into the purchase
order agreement" when he did not even pretend to act
as agent nor for the benefit of plaintiff when he signed
Exhibits 19-P and 20-P. Defendants did not intend
Brimhall to sign as a joint venturer or for American
Aggregate Corporation, when defendants prepared
those documents behind the backs of plaintiff's officers,
in order to obtain plaintiff's aggregate at a price below
plaintiff's costs by a deal made personally with Brimhall. The court also committed prejudicial error in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, when defendants
themselves proved they were engaged in an unlawful
scheme to appropriate a competitor's property to the
use and benefit of defendants to unjustly enrich themselves to the further detriment and damage of plaintiff
by causing plaintiff to suffer a loss.
POINT II.
T H E COURT E R R E D P R E J U D I C I A L L Y I N
FINDING
THAT
PLAINTIFF
SUBSEQUENTLY "RATIFIED" THE
UNCONSCIONABLE PURCHASE ORDER B E T W E E N
OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY A N D BRIMHALL, FOR SUCH DOCUMENT SECRETLY
E X E C U T E D TO D E F R A U D P L A I N T I F F , A
COMPETITOR, COULD NOT L E G A L L Y BE
R A T I F I E D UNDER T H E PROVISIONS OF
T H E U T A H U N F A I R P R A C T I C E S ACT.
The trial court did not sign any pretrial order, but
allowed each party to proceed on its or his own proposed pretrial order. (R. 1-3, Ab. 1). As shown by the
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First Claim of plaintiff in its proposed revised pretrial
order, plaintiff sued in tort for unlawful acts of defendants as competitor of plaintiff, for hauling away
4,000 tons of milk white quartz by a scheme amounting
to unfair competition and unfair trade practices. (R.
817-822).
Among other things, appellant contends that Exhibit 19-P, to which plaintiff never was a party, was
an illegal price-fixing agreement between defendants
and Brimhall, the crushing contractor, and illegal and
void under Title 50, Chapter 1, U. C. A. 1953, with
plaintiff as the victim. By defendants' own admissions,
after defendants refused to accept plaintiff's price quotations for plaintiff's good, defendants entered into an
illegal agreement with Brimhall by an illegal inducement to pay him $5,000 to sign such illegal agreement,
thereby fixing the price behind the backs of plaintiff's
officers for the sale of goods not only below plaintiff's
quoted prices, but below plaintiff's costs.
Plaintiff contends that Exhibit 19-P, was an illegal
agreement, void under the provisions of the Utah Unfair Practices Act, Title 13, Chapter 5, U. C. A. 1953.
The pertinent provisions are quoted with certain portions italicized in Appendix A to this brief. Contrary
to the court findings, plaintiff did not see Exhibit 19-P
until about May 1, 1970, then refused to sign it because
it not only was below plaintiff's quoted prices, but even
below plaintiff's costs. Section 13-5-7 makes it unfair
competition for any person to sell or offer to sell merchandise either as a wholesaler or retailer, at less than
cost, to injure a competitor. The term "cost" shall
"include the cost of raw materials, labor and all overhead expenses of the producer." As hereinabove stated,
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overhead expenses included a number of items of cost,
which brought the cost at least above $20.50, and according to the estimate of plaintiff's officers in 1970,
about $25.00 per ton. Section 13-5-3 makes it unlawful
to discriminate in price between purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, to lessen competition
or injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly grants or receives
the benefit of such discrimination. Subsection (f)
makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to induce
or receive a discrimination in price. Section 13-5-6
specifies that any person who as a director, officer or
agent of a firm aides directly or indirectly in violating
the provisions of the chapter, is equally responsible with
the corporation or firm for which he acts. Consequently,
P a u l Buehner, as president, general manager of Otto
Buehner & Company who engineered the illegal and
unconscionable violations, was joined as a defendant,
for he master-minded the illegal acts.
Section 13-5-13 declares that
" A n y contract, expressed or implied, made by
any person, in violation of any of the provisions
of this act is declared to be an illegal contract
and no recovery thereon shall be had."
If plaintiff had actually attempted to ratify such
an outrageous contract designed to fleece plaintiff, the
ratification would have been void, for such a contract
being illegal cannot be ratified, because Section 13-5-17
states that the creation of monopolies and unfair and
discriminatory practices are against public policy.
W e incorporate under this Point I I the evidence
and argument under Point I , and we supplement the
facts from the record herein to show the vicious and
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overreaching character of the illegal scheme to swindle
the plaintiff; also the deceit and subterfuge employed
in the cover-up, including the misleading and false reports to prevent plaintiff from learning about what was
taking place behind the backs of its officers for as long
a time as possible.
On his disposition Paul Buehner made a number of
admissions, some of which have heretofore been cited,
but at the trial he attempted to explain them away or
contradict them. W e believe that his admissions on deposition in addition to his admissions at the trial constitute an estoppel by oath. On deposition Buehner
testified that he knew it had been the practice all along
to give the aggregate sizes to the crushing contractor.
(R. 156, Ab. 21). At the trial he tried to argue that he
understood that Don R. Reimann said he could negotiate with Brimhall; but he told only a half truth, for
Don testified that he said he could negotiate with Brimhall as to sizes of the aggregate Buehners would take.
(R. 365, Ab. 48).
Defendant Paul Buehner as well as plaintiff's
president and vice-president, Richard C. and Don R.
Reimann, knew that the Park Valley White quartz
from plaintiff's quarry was specified as the aggregate
for the cast stone for the new Church Office Building
in Salt Lake City in 1969. The Buehners formerly had
an interest in that quarry. Paul Buehner testified that
there was some other milk white quartz located in Virginia. (R. 28, Ab. 4). Buehner knew that after
American Aggregate Corporation leased the quarry, his
company had purchased some of that milk-white quartz
from plaintiff at $35 a ton, as shown by Exhibit 4-P
(R. 30-31, Ah. 4). When Paul Buehner in September
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1969 asked Don R. Reimann, vice-president of plaintiff
for a quotation on 3,500 to 4,000 of the white quartz, he
was given a quotation of $29.50 a ton delivered; but
Buehner, whose company had been paying $35 a ton
declared that it was "too high". Buehner falsely represented that he could get either the same material or
similar material from a man named Chidester. Don
Reimann answered that "they couldn't get that material unless they stole it from us. It was specified on
the job." (R. 338, Ab. 42). Buehner then falsely represented he "could substitute materials." Such attempted deceit-scare-tactics did not work on Don Reimann, for he told Buehner he had talked to the architect and found out there would be no substitution. Consequently, plaintiff refused to lower its quotation. (R.
339-340, Ab. 42-43).
Buehner as manager of a competitor of plaintiff,
used a quotation of $19.50 a ton from Chidester for
material not specified and not acceptable on the job.
Such attempted leverage designed to force plaintiff to
lower its price, was part of the subterfuge involving
unfair and deceitful tactics to obtain discrimination in
price for the type of material specified and approved
by the architects. I t also was part of an illegal pricefixing scheme for defendants to fix and control plaintiff's prices. The defendants Buehner well-knew they
had to have the Park Valley milk-white quartz from
plaintiffs quarry to comply with an existing contract,
because it was the only place where it was being produced in Utah; and defendants knew that they could
not legally substitute any other material. Except for
some pieces of "float" there was no milk-white quartz
then available on State-owned lands in Section 22 al31
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legedly under the control of Chidester, to the east of
plaintiff's quarry in Section 21.
Section 13-5-8 makes it unlawful for any person
engaged in business to "advertise goods, wares or merchandise they are not prepared to supply." Chidester
could not have advertised that he was able to supply
the P a r k Valley milk-white quartz specified for the
Church Office building job, not only because he had
no rights in plaintiff's quarry where the architect's approved aggregate was produced, but for the further
reason no one ever submitted to the architect for approval any sample of materials which might possibly
be produced on the leaseholds to the east under the
control of Chidester. If Buehners had entertained any
belief that they could have obtained approval, they
would not have failed to submit such samples.
Donald G. Prince, a geologist employed by the
Division of State L a n d s (admitted to be qualified as
to the nature of the stone in question), testified t h a t
for a number of years he had searched the State lands
in Section 22 to ascertain the different colors of quartz.
I t was admitted that Exhibit 3-P, a sample of the P a r k
Valley white quartz (known as milk-white quartz)
came from plaintiff's quarry in Section 21. (R. 18,
A b . 3 ) . Prince said the only place he found t h a t white
material was in Section 2 1 ; t h a t as you get into Section
22 the material becomes buff or t a n colored. (R. 1014, A b . 1-2).
J o h n W . Rigby, one of the locators of the mining
claims in Section 21 who leased to American A g g r e g a t e
Corporation in 1966, has been familiar with the area
for 13 years. H e testified that this milk-white quartz
of which Exhibit 3-P is a sample, with the commercial
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name of "Park Valley White Quartz", ends at the east
end of Section 21; that after many weeks of exploration lands to the east, except for some float, the quartzite to the east of Section 21 is gray, gray-white, and
with an opaque luster. (R. 16-20, Ab. 2-3). This may
illustrate why Paul Buehner did not even bother to
submit any samples from the Chidester leaseholds.
Even John Chidester himself, although he testified
that there is a "certain similarity" between Exhibit 3-P
and materials on his State leaseholds, admitted he had
no experience in identifying materials; never produced
any aggregate; never had any comprehensive test or
chemical analysis made of those materials; never submitted any sample to the architect for approval, nor
had any of the quartz on his leaseholds crushed to see
how it would appear for whiteness; but he knew that
the material on American Aggregate property in Section 21 was "designated by the architect". (R. 105-110,
Ab. 14-15). Chidester said there are many types of
white quartz; that white quartz crops out in three
places.... that a lot of quartz looks white at a distance.
H e said there was some opaque material there, some
with rust-colored stain in the fissures; also some green
quartz, gray quartz, and other types, also some black
rock, some of which gets into the white quartz; and
some buff colored material on both sides of the fence.
Some exposed material up there has a sheen, and some
is closer to a sugar-type quartz, with what appears like
a calcite sheen. (R. 111-120, Ab. 15-16). I t is no
wonder that neither Chidester nor Buehner tried to get
the architect to approve any sample of those materials
as a substitute for the materials produced on plaintiff's
properties which were specified by the architect.
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After Buehner failed to succeed in getting plaintiff
to respond to his enormous price chiseling to get a discriminatory price for Otto Buehner & Company, he decided to work on D . W . Brimhall. Buehner admitted
he "had Mr. Brimhall go back and forth to American
Aggregate Corporation several times." H e told Brimhall to tell Don and Rich Reimann that their price was
"too high", and to tell them they "would have to come
down" on the price; and that if he didn't get that material at his price, he was "going to substitute some
other material." (R. 45, Ab. 6). Buehner then falsely
represented to Brimhall that instead of taking selected
sizes the Buehners were going to take "crusher run",
and for Brimhall to find out what kind of a quote they
would give on "crusher run". (R. 45, Ab. 6). Brimhall
came back with a quotation from plaintiff of $25.50 a
ton for crusher run, and Buehner said, "No deal." (R.
48-49, Ab. 7). Buehner falsely represented that he
could make a deal with Chidester "for material that was
just as good at 19.50 a ton delivered." Buehner knew
Chidester did not even have a quarry opened up at that
time. (R. 50, Ab. 7). Buehner said he also told Brimhall that he could get the same kind of material some
other place. (R. 141, Ab. 19). Buehner knew that
representation was false.
Buehner said he then had several conversations
with Brimhall before making out the purchase order,
including the statement that he planned to take crusher
run. Buehner admitted he did not know what agreement Brimhall had with American Aggregate, but he
knew Brimhall was to be paid for crushing the rock.
(R. 143, Ab. 19). Buehner testified that during the
conversation with Brimhall he told Brimhall he would
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give him $5,000 "move-in cost", over and above the
25.50 or 20.50 a ton. (R. 565, Ab. 80). Buehner admitted that he prepared Exhibit 19-P, purchase order
to Brimhall, and also Exhibit 20-P specifying sizes. H e
also admitted that there was no statement in those
documents about crusher run. (R. 144-146, Ab. 19).
Buehner thus induced Brimhall to sign a different deal
from what he had negotiated, since he negotiated for
"crusher run." The Buehners never even sent American
Aggregate Corporation a copy of the purchase order.
(R. 147, Ab. 19-20), obviously because they did not
want American Aggregate to know of the unconscionable fraudulent deal he had signed with Brimhall to
deprive plaintiff of its materials.
The secret transaction between the Buehners and
Brimhall reeks with illegal price fixing and unfair
trade practices to the injury and detriment of plaintiff.
Both Brimhall's version and Buehner's representation
of what occurred showed a design to illegally appropriate plaintiff's aggregate for the benefit of Otto Buehner
& Company. Defendants Buehner knew it would be
futile to ask Amreican Aggregate Corporation to accept
a purchase order to sell selected sizes of Park Valley
White Quartz aggregate for $20.50 a ton when it had
quoted $29.50 a ton for the quantity in question for the
job instead of the regular price of $35.00 a ton, particularly after plaintiff quoted $25.50 a ton for "crusher
run" (which the Buehners never intended to take), and
then stated positively that American Aggregate would
not go below that last figure for crusher run. Brimhall
knew plaintiff would not accept a purchase order from
the Buehners for $20.50 a ton because plaintiff already
had told him it could not go below $25.50 a ton without
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going in the red. (R. 240-244, A b . 32-33). E v e n if
Brimhall believed Buehner's false representation t h a t
he would substitute other materials or get the same materials elsewhere, the Buehners themselves knew they
could not substitute, and that Otto Buehner & Company
could not perform its contract for manufacture of the
cast stone for the new Church Office building without
using plaintiff's P a r k Valley W h i t e quartz specified
as the aggregate. Buehner also knew that no one else
had t h a t aggregate available except plaintiff, a competitor of his company.
Brimhall's version was that Buehner said he would
give Brimhall $20.50 a ton plus $5,000 "move-in," and
that he accepted it immediately, and that it was on the
basis of crusher run. (R. 608-609, A b . 8 8 ) . Brimhall
also said that P a u l Buehner told him that if he did not
sign a purchase order, he (Buehner) was going to give
Chidester a contract. (R. 632, A b . 9 2 ) . Buehner said
he already had issued a purchase order to Chidester,
and that Brimhall wanted to make a deal; and t h a t
Buehner then said he would give "a little bit more."
(R. 554, A b . 78). However, the Chidester deal was
p a r t of a subterfuge on the p a r t of the Buehners, for
almost immediately after Brimhall signed Exhibit 19-P
the Chidester purchase order Exhibit 15-D was canceled. Chidester testified that Buehner asked for cancelation within 2 to 4 days after it was signed, and that
it was canceled without compensation. (R. 103A, A b .
14).
The trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling plaintiff's objections to Chidester's testimony,
(most of which was hearsay), and to the incompetent
and irrelevant Exhibit 15-D. Such evidence was offered
36
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under the sham defense of "reasonable value" of plaintiff's aggregate, when there was no production from the
Chidester leaseholds, and it was not the same material
on which plaintiff had quoted, nor the same material
specified. Such conduct demonstrated an unlawful determination to fix plaintiff's price. The objection that
such defense was sham, should have been sustained, for
there was no right to substitute such unproduced materials. The plaintiff had the right to quote prices for
its materials without interference from defendants. Defendants had no right to seize plaintiffs materials from
plaintiffs quarry, and haul them away to satisfy a contract, then dictate to plaintiff a lesser price below plaintiffs quoted price, particularly a price below plaintiffs
costs. Counsel for plaintiff objected from the beginning
that defendant's conduct constituted unfair trade practices, and unfair competition in violation of law. Nor
did the trial court have any right to fix plaintiff's prices
below plaintiff's quotations nor condone the defendants'
illegal price fixing below plaintiff's costs.
Defendants obviously recognized that the Chidester
deal was not one whereby the Buehners could perform
the cast stone contract which required the use of materials from plaintiff's quarry. We repeat, if Buehners
had used such unallowable substitute material, it would
have been a fraud on the Church as owner of the building, as well as on the general contractor. The Chidester
plan was a highly impracticable theory, so the Buehners
obviously knew it would not work even if the substitution had been allowable. Chidester admitted that instead of crushing at the quarry he would open up, he
would haul the rock to Salt Lake County for crushing,
and that it would take 1/3 more rock because of wast37
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age, with 1/3 greater hauling charges, and 1/3 more
royalty, as well as opening a quarry late in the fall and
quarrying or mining during the winter. (R. 115-116,
122-127, A b . 15-17). Chidester erroneously assumed
that the yellow stains on his rock could be removed by
acid. (R. 127-128, A b . 17).
Brimhall, of course, did not send plaintiff a copy
of Exhibit 19-P, obviously because legal proceedings
would have been instituted immediately to stop the
looting of plaintiff's quarry. Instead, he called plaintiff
and stated that Buehners were going to accept the rock
from American Aggregate quarry, which certainly did
not come as any surprise, for plaintiff's officers knew
that Otto Buehner & Company had no choice. (R. 345346, A b . 44). T h e n early in November 1969, Brimhall
called about hauling. T h e hauling was included in the
quotation of $29.50 per ton, and it was to be done by
American Aggregate. Brimhall said Buehners had t o
have all of the material by the first of the year, and
that American A g g r e g a t e could not possibly haul all
of it. D o n Reimann said his company wanted to haul
as much as possible. Brimhall suggested getting bids
from truckers. E a c h called some truckers, Brimhall
said to get up to the quarry and start hauling as quickly
as possible. D o n Reimann started hauling November
15th. I t was necessary to have weigh tickets to satisfy
the lessors for payment of royalty. (R. 346-349, A b .
44-45). Marvin L . Allred, Buehner's plant superintendent, stated that he told one of the drivers for
American A g g r e g a t e Corporation in November 1969
that he should not haul in any more material at t h a t
time because the bins were crowded. (R. 468, A b . 65,
R . 485, A b . 6 9 ) . This was p a r t of the cover-up to get
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plaintiff involved and apparently designed to make
plaintiff a party to the illegal operation without any
disclosure of the secret illegal and fraudulent purchase
order to Brimhall.
Plaintiff did not even find out until the time of
trial, that on November 11, 1969, Otto Buehner &
Company issued a purchase order to Clark Tank Lines,
Exhibit 5-D for "Delivery of approximately 4,000 tons
finished Aggregate Park Valley quartz to Otto Buehner Company bins," for $7.55 per ton. Clark Tank
Lines then sublet to Gaylen Christensen of Tremonton.
H . E . Barker, then director of sales said the Buehner
Company issued said purchase order. Instructions as
to size were given by Mr. Allred, each day. (R. R.
52-58, Ab. 7-8).
Plaintiff's officers anticipated receiving a purchase
order from Otto Buehner & Company, soon after hauling started, on the basis of $29.50 per ton, since selected
sizes were being hauled to the Buehner plant. (R. 399,
415, Ab. 53, 56). Plaintiff had previous experience
with Otto Buehner & Company on delay of a purchase
order until after partial delivery, September to December 1967, Exhibit 4-P, which stated: "This is the
total amount needed including those amounts already
shipped." Those materials in 1967 were billed at the
regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 423, Ab. 57, 97-101).
When no purchase order arrived seasonably, Don
Reimann called Paul Buehner's office in December,
1969, but was unable to contact him. When the call
was not returned, about the end of December or first
part of January, Reimann called again and was referred to someone else at the Buehner company office.
H e asked to talk with someone about Park Valley
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quartz, Reimann asked when the purchase order was
coming. The one on the phone at Buehners' said, " W e
have made an agreement with M r . Brimhall. See him
about it." (There was no pretense of an agreement
with plaintiff). M r . Rigby had come into plaintiff's
office in December several times and demanded weigh
slips showing what was going out of the quarry, for
royalty had to be paid on a monthly basis. N o n e had
been received. (R. 349-353, A b . 45-46).
D o n Reimann then endeavored to reach M r . Brimhall early in J a n u a r y , but he was unsuccessful at first.
W h e n he finally reached him about J a n u a r y 12, 1970,
D o n Reimann told Brimhall he had been told by
Buehners that they had made an agreement with him
of some kind; also, that Rigby had come in demanding
weigh slips and royalty, and it was necessary to have
an accounting on what had been shipped. Reimann told
Brimhall he wanted to talk to him, and wanted to know
what had happened. Brimhall said, "Z am afraid I have
done something wrong, but I can't talk about it now.
I am going on vacation." Brimhall was asked to cancel
his vacation because they ought to know what transpired ; but Brimhall said D o n would have to wait until
he returned. (R. 353-357, A b . 45-77).
Richard C. Reimann, president of plaintiff, also
attempted to call P a u l Buehner early in J a n u a r y 1970,
was unable to reach him, left his number to call back,
but the call was not returned. Rigby came into the
office again, upset because he had not been paid royalty.
H e made threats. Rich Reimann reached Brimhall by
telephone while Rigby was still there, and said, "Rigby
is in here and he is going to shut down that pit unless
we have some payment on royalty. I have no idea what
40 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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has been delivered." Brimhall said he would get a
check for what had been hauled out of there, and weigh
tickets too. W h e n asked to come to a meeting, Brimhall said he could not meet then because he was going
to Mexico. Brimhall did not furnish any information
before he left. (R. 448-449, A b . 6 1 ) .
On J a n u a r y 23, 1970, plaintiff received from
Brimhall a check for $1,954.41, Exhibit 44-P "royalty
P a r k Valley quartz 1,302.94 tons." Along with it was
merely a list of November shipments to Otto Buehner
& Co., Exhibit 43-P showing a total of 1,302.94 tons,
with a signed statement of Brimhall, " I will see that
a copy of delivery tickets are sent to you." (Ab. 127128). Those two documents were received after Brimhall left. (R. 450-451, A b . 61).
About the middle of F e b r u a r y 1970, Richard C.
Beimann called P a u l Buehner's office, but was unable
t o reach him; then he asked to talk to someone about
the P a r k Valley quartz coming into Buehners for the
Church Office Building. H e was connected with the
office manager. Beimann identified himself as the
president of American Aggregate Corporation, and
said, "This rock has been coming out of P a r k Valley
for the Church Office Building. I would like to know
when we are going to receive payment on this." T h e
office manager of Otto Buehner & Company answered,
"You are not going to get paid." (R. 451-453, A b .
61-62). This illustrated the determination of defendants to divest plaintiff of possession of its properties
and pay plaintiff nothing for it, which was unlawful
and fraudulent, as well as a combination of unfair
trade practices.
N e a r the middle of F e b r u a r y D o n Reimann called
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Clark Tank Lines and spoke to H a l Barker. Reimann
told Barker that Clark Tank Lines had gone onto
American Aggregate property and hauled out rock;
that the property did not belong to the Buehners nor
to Brimhall, and " I want you to stop the hauling right
now." Barker told him to "go to hell." H e said, "We
have a contract with Buehners to haul, and if you interfere we'll sue you." Later, a copy of a letter addressed
to Paul Buehner from Clark Tank Lines dated June
22, 1970, Exhibit 6-P was received. The court erroneously excluded said letter. (R. 372-378, Ab. 49-50).
Hal Barker, director of sales for Clark Tank Lines,
admitted having a conversation about January 1970
with Don Reimann, who asked who gave authority to
haul materials belonging to American Aggregate Corporation down to Otto Buehner & Company; that Buehners had no authority to take any materials out of
there. H e said Exhibit 6-P (Ab. 134) contained his
signature by someone else in the office. H e said Clark
Tank Lines took orders from Otto Buehner & Company, and never sent any copies of weigh tickets to
American Aggregate. (R. 65-71, Ab. 9).
After Brimhall returned in March or April, Don
Reimann attempted to reach him to get a meeting with
him and Paul Buehner, but there was difficulty in
getting Buehner to a meeting. However, in April before the meeting was held, Paul Buehner called Brimhall and said he anticipated needing another 700 tons
of aggregate. Brimhall said he would have to get in
touch with American Aggregate Corporation and make
a deal; and that any additional material would have
to be at a different quote. As stated on deposition:
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" I informed him (Paul Buehner) at this time
that I had already overstepped my bounds with
American Aggregate and that I had problems,
and he would have to negotiate this with American Aggregate." (R. 232-233, 291-293, Ab. 3132,37).
In the meantime, American Aggregate was frustrated in its efforts to obtain information as to tonnage
going out the quarry. It was unable to obtain any
weigh tickets or accounting information to settle royalty
with the Rigbys. After Brimhall returned to Utah the
Reimanns complained to him that a lot of material was
being taken out without any report, and Brimhall admitted they complained because they could not get
weigh tickets or accounting. H e said he called Paul
Beuhner to get some reports. (R. 246, Ab. 33). When
a meeting was finally arranged it was held about May
1, 1970, at the Style-Crete office, between Richard C.
Reimann, Don R. Reimann, Paul Buehner and D . W .
Brimhall. According to Brimhall, "there were some
pretty hot words uttered at that meeting." (R. 286,
Ab. 37).
Don R. Reimann testified that at the beginning of
the meeting Brimhall was apologetic, said he was sure
he had done something wrong he felt sorry for. Don
and Rich Reimann said they wanted to know what had
happened. Paul Buehner produced the purchase order
Exhibit 19-P. That was the first time it was seen by
Don or Rich Reimann, and the first time they learned
the price on it. Buehner asked American Aggregate
to sign it, but Don and Rich Reimann refused. Don
said it wasn't made to American Aggregate and they
never quoted that price. Don asked Paul Buehner if
he was going to make up the difference. H e said that
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he had a "bona fide purchase order with Brimhall",
and he would not make up the difference, and if the
difference had to be made up, Brimhall would have to
pay the difference. (Under the Unfair Practices act,
that purchase order was illegal, and Buehner could not
enforce it against anyone). When Brimhall was asked
if he would make up the difference, he said he couldn't,
that it would break him. Buehner then said, "you made
plenty of money at this lower figure. I don't know why
you want any more." Don Reimann told Buehner he
"had a lot of guts to come in here and tell us how much
we can make." Don also said that under no condition
would plaintiff sign that purchase order, "because we
never quoted that price . . . I t will be below our cost
and we'll not sign it." (R. 358-360, Ab. 47-48). 458,
Ab. 47-48, 63).
Richard C. Reimann testified that Buehner said
that Don had told him to get in touch with Brimhall,
but Don said that only had to do with the sizes of the
rock. Don also said, "You know Paul, that you bought
rock from us before, and that we have quoted you a
price on the same rock before. Now how could you
sign up an agreement with a purchase order with DeMar Brimhall?" Richard said he asked Buehner, "If
I was to come down to your plant, Paul, and ask you
about a particular piece of cast stone, and you told
me to refer to somebody in your shop and I did, would
I make a purchase order with your man at the shop or
make it out to Buehner & Company?" Buehner did not
answer. Richard stated that either he or Don said they
"could not sell the rock at 20.50 a ton because it's below our cost." (R. 453-458, Ab. 62-63).
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erence, D o n and Rich Reimann withdrew and conferred with each other. T h e n D o n said that under certain conditions "we would not bring suit against Buehners." There were four conditions: (1) " W e had to
have weigh tickets monthly." (2) " W e had to have an
accounting of payment monthly up to date." (3) " T h e
money had to be paid to American A g g r e g a t e . " (d)
U n d e r no condition was more than 4,000 tons to be
taken out of that quarry, and if it was it would be at
the full price of $35 a ton. D o n said he was very
emphatic about it. H e said they had to have an accounting every month so they could settle royalty with
Rigby. (R. 360-363, A b . 48). Rich Reimann related
the same conditions, under which "we would not press
charges or sue, if certain conditions were met." ( R .
456-458, A b . 6 3 ) . Rich Reimann testified also that
Brimhall said several times that " P a u l was not to use
this rock on any other j o b . "
Brimhall testified that he heard the Reimanns say
at the meeting that they were going to refrain from
suing Otto Buehner & Company if they did certain
things, and one of them was to produce the weigh
tickets. (R. 623, A b . 9 0 ) . Earlier he testified that at
such meeting D o n said they would not sue if they got
a proper accounting each month, copies of weigh tickets,
and payment each month. Brimhall said he didn't deny
t h a t D o n stated that if any material in excess of 4,000
tons was taken, it would be at the rate of $35 a ton.
(R. 234, A b . 3 2 ) .
Paul
Reimanns
about the
conditions

Buehner said he could not recall asking the
to sign the purchase order at that meeting
first of May. A t first he denied that any
for not filing suit were mentioned, then
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stated: " W e did all of those conditions," but when
asked when, he hedged starting with the item of accounting. (R. 151-152, A b . 20). H e testified that he
promised to furnish copies of all weigh tickets and as
to tonnage hauled, and said "we have done that." W h e n
asked when, he was evasive and said he did not handle
those matters. (R. 156, A b . 21). H e said he knew
that American Aggregate claimed ownership of the
materials that were shipped to Otto Buehner & Company. H e admitted that on deposition he testified that
at said meeting he stated that whatever difference there
was between American Aggregate Corporation's quoted
price and Brimhall, Brimhall would have to take care of
it; that he had a signed contract with Brimhall, and
that he was "going to hold him to it." H e also admitted
that Rich Reimann asked him if he was in the habit of
letting his janitor sign purchase orders for him. ( R .
153-154, A b . 21).
Defendants never did render any monthly accounting, and never gave plaintiff any weigh tickets.
(R. 363, A b . 48). After repeated requests, P a u l Buehner said he would take care of it, but merely sent a
letter dated J u n e 16, 1970, Exhibit 25-P which disclosed for the first time that D . W . Brimhall had been
paid $23,185.78 as of M a y 31, 1970. (R. 364, A b . 4 8 ) .
T h e actual tonnage delivered by Clark T a n k Lines was
not stated, merely the 1978.66 tons hauled for which
Buehners had paid for hauling, which was found 330
tons short in 1971 when plaintiff's counsel finally obtained from Otto Buehner & Company's legal counsel
shortly before suit, Exhibit 24-P, whereby it admitted
it had received 4,913.98 tons through Clark T a n k Lines
(exclusive of the 259 tons received directly from plaintiff and never paid f o r ) .
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Exhibit 25-P disclosed that Otto Buehner & Company already had paid to Brimhall $23,185.78. Not
having paid anything to plaintiff, and having stated
to plaintiff's president, "You are not going to be paid,"
defendant manifested an intent and design to take
plaintiff's materials without paying plaintiff anything
for them, to the unlawful and unjust enrichment of
defendants. Until June 29, 1970, Otto Buehner &
Company did not even add plaintiff's name to the
checks. Even after the meeting the first of May or
last part of April 1970, Paul Buehner manifested contempt for plaintiff and for plaintiff's property rights
by paying directly to Brimhall, notwithstanding one of
the conditions plaintiff's officers stated for refraining
from bringing suit, was the payment of the money each
month to plaintiff. (Brimhall had no right to collect
any money from any purchaser under his agreement
with plaintiff, but was to be paid by plaintiff when
plaintiff collected the sale price).
It is significant that defendants never even complied with the conditions they wrote into the purchase
order issued to Brimhall, Exhibit 19-P, (Ab. 110),
which specified that "90% of the value of material will
be paid within 30 days of receipt of same." Defendants
never paid any attention to that except possibly on the
first payment made in January 1970. Otto Buehner &
Company took the attitude that it would comply if and
when it saw fit to do so.
Defendants were well aware of the fact that plaintiff had to pay royalty monthly of $1.50 per ton to
the Rigbys on all materials hauled out of the quarry,
and to furnish copies of weigh slips and a monthly
accounting. Defendants knew that by withholding
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copies of weigh slips and the accounting information
from plaintiff as to tonnage being hauled out of the
quarry they were subjecting plaintiff t o the hazard of
having its lease on the quarry canceled. If defendants
planned and designed to have plaintiff's lease on that
quarry canceled (from which defendants were hauling
away the aggregate by their own contract carriers),
they could not have done more to accomplish such an
objective than what defendants did in persistantly
withholding the information P a u l Buehner admittedly
promised, but never furnished. U n t i l shortly prior t o
the filing of suit, defendants did not condescend to make
that information in Exhibit 24-P available.
Plaintiff met with frustration time after time in
trying to obtain that information from Clark T a n k
Lines and from Christensen F e e d & Seed, which did
the hauling for the Buehners. W h e n plaintiff finally
got a purported list of loads hauled to Buehners (not
weigh slips) from the latter in the fall of 1970 after
defendants stopped hauling, only 2,625.59 tons were
reported by Exhibit 7-P. E v e n the "corrected" report,
Exhibit 28-P, showed only 3,179.055 tons. Clark T a n k
Lines as of September 25, 1970, issued Exhibit 21-P,
showing a total of only 2,429.78 tons, which later was
admitted to be more than 50% short. ( A b . 103-104,
112-114, 119-121). Plaintiff's officers were forced t o
wade through a maze of false and misleading information for over a year in efforts to find out what had
been taken out of the quarry by defendants. (R. 367371, 461-467, A b . 49-51, 64-65).
Defendants Buehner never complied with any of
the four conditions plaintiff specified for
refraining
from filing suit: N o weigh tickets were ever furnished,
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there was no monthly accounting at any time, and no
list of loads hauled out even given until 14 months
later, payment never was made directly to plaintiff,
and what payments were made on the 4,000 tons prior
to June 29, 1970, were made solely to Brimhall, and
after that date the name of plaintiff was merely added
to the checks sent to Brimhall, but no payments were
made monthly. In fact the last two checks for a total
of $8,830.42 although dated July 7, 1970, were not
received by Brimhall until March 25, 1971. (R. 548549, Ab. 77).
The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding that plaintiff "by actions subsequent to the signing of the Purchase Order Agreement, ratified and
accepted the said Purchase Order Agreement." (R.
857, Ab. 140). There was no competent evidence of
any "ratification", and under the provisions of the Unfair Practices Act, since the conduct of defendants involved illegal price-fixing on plaintiff's goods, and a
sale by Brimhall below plaintiff's costs, and other
fraudulent and unfair practices. There could not have
been any "ratification"; for plaintiff refused to sign it,
because it was below plaintiff's quoted price and below
cost. A further reason is, plaintiff merely promised to
refrain from suing defendants if the defendants would
comply with four conditions, none of which defendants
ever complied with.
First of all, the doctrine of "ratification" applies
only when an agent does some unauthorized act for the
benefit of his principal. Jones v. Bank of America Nat.
Trust & Savings, 49 Cal. App. 2d 115, 121 P.2d 94,
98. Brimhall was not the agent of American Aggregate
Corporation. Furthermore, what he did was done ad49
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versely to plaintiff and for the benefit of defendants.
A s hereinabove pointed out, Brimhall was used as an
instrumentality or tool by the Buehners to cheat and
defraud the plaintiff and to unjustly and illegally enrich the Buehners. This Court in Jones v. Mutual
Creamery Co., 81 U t a h 223, 17 P . 2d 256, 259, 85
A . L . R . 908, held that "ratification" is the adoption
by one person of an act in his behalf by another, acting
as his agent without authority. The one who is charged
with "ratification" must be provided with all of the
material facts. I n this case for a long period of time
the facts were concealed. A t the meeting about M a y
1, 1970, the officers of plaintiff flatly refused to sign
or approve the fraudulent purchase order, Exhibit
19-P, because it purported to be a sale of plaintiff's
materials by Brimhall who was unauthorized, at a sale
price $9 below plaintiff's quotations of $29.50 to defendants, and even below plaintiff's costs. T h a t conduct on the p a r t of Brimhall and defendants was not
only detrimental and financially ruinous to plaintiff,
but it was designed to unlawfully and unjustly enrich
defendant Otto Buehner & Company, a competitor of
plaintiff.
Furthermore, on the face of the record, Exhibit
19-P was a subterfuge, for P a u l Buehner admitted that
his company was going to take "crusher run", but the
outrageous purchase order was for "selected sizes,"
and it contained an illegal inducement of $5,000 to
Brimhall (undisclosed to plaintiff) to sell plaintiff's
aggregate behind the backs of plaintiff's officers at a
price illegally dictated by defendants, below plaintiff's
costs; and that purchase order was in the name of
Brimhall with all money payable to Brimhall. Conse-
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quently it was the worst species of fraud. Defendants
expressly refused payment to plaintiff and made all
payments to Brimhall down to June 29, 1970.
The plaintiff had no duty to refrain from suing
after defendants ignored the four conditions named by
defendants for not bringing suit. The testimony of
Paul Buehner that his company complied with those
conditions was patently false, when neither he nor his
company complied with any of them.
It is appropriate to quote from the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in Ralph A. Badger &
Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan, 94 Utah 97 at 126,
75 P . 2d 669, in a situation in which the defendant loan
corporation circumvented the certificate holder and depressed the market and resorted to subterfuge, but the
trial court found no design to defraud:
". . . If this were the case, it presents a plain
case of overreaching. A principle quite ultimate
has been violated. A debtor so actively misleading the creditor to the benefit of the one and the
detriment of the other would be violating a most
fundamental legal concept and one which reaches
back to the moral law crystalized in the Ten
Commandments.
"The trial court before which the facts of this
case were fully presented found these issues
against plaintiff, and that there was no scheme
or intention on the part of defendant to misstate facts or defraud plaintiff. . . . Under such
circumstances, even though the result came from
an innocent or careless impartation of information followed by the subsequent acquisition of
plaintiff's certificate and not from a deliberate
design on the part of the defendant, the defendant debtor cannot profit from his creditor.
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For such restitution of this loss was the complaint
filed, and such restitution do we decree" (Italics
added).
Although this Court held that the defendant could
not obtain unjust enrichment with judicial approval
even if the statements made by defendant were not designed to defraud, there can be no doubt that P a u l
Buehner intended to defraud plaintiff, not only by deceit and threats involving a claim that other materials
would be substituted when he knew there was no substitution allowable, but Buehner used cunning techniques to get possession of plaintiff's materials without
paying plaintiff's quoted price. W h e n Buehner could
not succeed in his chiseling tactics with D o n Reimann,
he started to use Brimhall. Brimhall was his tool. Otto
Buehner & Company had to have the American A g g r e gate Corporation's P a r k Valley milk-white-quartz
crushed aggregate in order to comply with the terms of
a cast stone manufacturing contract, and the Buehners
were illegally determined to get that material not
merely without paying plaintiff its quoted price, but
by dealing behind the backs of plaintiff's officers t o
get the materials at their dictated price which they had
no legal authority to dictate to a competitor.
W i t h o u t detailing how many of the T e n Commandments were violated we wish to remark that those commandments, ancient as they are, have become imbedded
in our secular law. Several years ago when a magazine
writer declared that the T e n Commandments "ought
to be revised", Richard L . E v a n s responded by saying,
"they ought to be re "•read." I n ordering removal of the
T e n Commandments monolith from the approach to the
Courts Building in Salt L a k e City, Chief J u d g e R i t t e r
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of the Federal Court in Utah scoffed at the idea that
those commandments have any place in our secular law,
with some implications that they are religious concepts
out of date. In reversing him in Anderson et al. v Salt
Lake City et al, 475 F.2d 29 (1973), the U.S. Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, noted that "the Decalogue
is at once religious and secular, and that the "monolith
is primarily secular". The Unfair Practices Act
adopted formally in 1937, was based on ancient legal
concepts, to prevent unfair trade methods and unfair
competition. Sharp traders who conjure up schemes to
get the goods of a competitor not only below quoted
prices, but even below his costs, when there is not outright stealing, there are manifestations of dishonesty.
First, they covet that which does not belong to them,
and seek to obtain unfairly the profit included in the
quoted price which the owner of the goods is legally entitled to receive. Many people do not hesitate to practice deceit in overreaching, all of which was condemned
as far back as the Mosaic Code: "Thou shalt not defraud they neighbor, neither rob him", etc. (Leviticus
19:15).
"Overreaching" is not only defined in the Badger
case, but in other decisions. In re BarucJis Will, 132
N. Y. S. 2d 402, 405, the term was construed to mean
to overdo, or to get the better of a person in a transaction by cunning and cheating, or by sharp practice.
Many years ago, the courts adopted the doctrine of
quasi-contract, whereby it was held that if a person takes
the goods of another, the fact that he might not intend
to pay for the goods at all or what they are worth, does
not relieve him of liability, for equity compelled just
compensation by requiring payment of the market price,
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so that a party could not profit from his own wrong or
unjustly enrich himself to the loss or detriment of his
adversary. As pointed out in the Badger case, a party
may not unjustly enrich himself to the detriment of
another in a business transaction, even if there is no
deliberate design on the part of the one unjustly enriched to accomplish such detrimental result to the injured party.
The modern doctrine of "Restitution" and "unjust
enrichment", are invoked even if no fraud is actually
intended. Hiocon v. Allpin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P . 2d
1042, 1045. Under Restatement of the Law, Sec. 1 a,
"Restitution", a person is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust. The Restatement is quoted in Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184
P .2d 335, 337, 338, that there is unjust enrichment
where one retains money or benefits which in justice
and equity belong to another.
Inasmuch as there was no innocent conduct on the
part of defendants, but an outright design to cheat and
defraud the plaintiff, and an actual scheme to get the
plaintiff's goods without paying for them, this is an aggravated case of overreaching illegal conduct by defendants. The trial court committed prejudicial error
in dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and by so doing inf erentially condoned the illegal and unconscionable conduct of the avoracious defendants.
III.
P L A I N T I F F WAS NOT L E G A L L Y BOUND
BY T H E "BRIMHALL P U R C H A S E ORDER''
W H I C H P L A I N T I F F N E V E R SIGNED NOR
A P P R O V E D , BUT T H E COURT P R E J U D I C 54
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I A L L Y I M P O S E D ON P L A I N T I F F A CONT R A C T TO A L L O W D E F E N D A N T S TO OBT A I N 4,000 T O N S A T D E F E N D A N T S ' D I C T A T E D P R I C E , P L U S A D D I T I O N A L AGGREGATE FOR OTHER JOBS
BELOW
PLAINTIFF'S QUOTED PRICES AND EVEN
B E L O W COSTS.
Plaintiff never executed the fraudulent and illegal
Brimhall ''purchase order", but stated that it would
refrain from suing if defendants complied with four
specified conditions; but defendants never complied
with any of them. However, the court not only found
that plaintiff was bound by the $20.50 per ton price
dictated by defendants to Brimhall, but even condoned
the taking of additional tonnage at the below-cost price
of $20.50 a ton for the extra tonnage. If a competitor
cannot legally dictate the prices at which an owner
sells his goods, by virtue of Title 50, Chapter 1 and
by Title 13, Chapter 5 (Unfair Practices Act), then
neither can the court do so to benefit and unjustly enrich such illegally operating competitor, nor decree that
the owner shall sell his goods to a competitor not only
below the owner's quoted prices, but even below costs
to thereby subject the owner to financial ruin.
One of the four conditions specified by the Reimanns at the meeting held about May 1, 1970, for refraining from suing the Buehners was that not more
than 4,000 tons would be taken, and that if any more
were hauled away the price would be the regular price
of $35 a ton. Before that meeting Brimhall already
had told Paul Buehner when Buehner said he anticipated needing another 700 tons, that it would have to
be at a "different quote", and to get in touch with the
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Reimanns. Brimhall testified he informed P a u l Buehner "that I had already overstepped my bounds with
American A g g r e g a t e and that I had problems, and he
would have t o negotiate this with American A g g r e gate." (R. 233-234, A b . 31-32).
About a month after the aforesaid meeting when
the four conditions for refraining from suing were specified by plaintiff, P a u l Buehner called plaintiff's president Richard C. Reimann and said he needed several
hundred more tons for another j o b ( B . Y . U.) Reimann
quoted Buehner the regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 459460, A b . 6 3 ) . About the same time, M a r v Allred, plant
superintendent for Otto Buehner & Company, called
D o n R . Reimann and asked for a price for the quartz
aggregate. H e also was quoted $35 a ton, which was
the same price charged in 1967 an d!968. Buehners did
not issue any purchase order, but plaintiff discovered
t h a t its aggregate continued to be hauled away from the
quarry by Otto Buehner &; Company. Nevertheless,
plaintiff continued to be frustrated in its efforts t o
obtain weigh slips from the Buehners, Clark T a n k
Lines, and from Christensen P e e d & Seed. N o n e were
ever furnished. (R. 367, A b . 48-49). B y request some
materials had been hauled by Roland Fawson, M a y 28,
29, J u n e 1 and 15, 1970; but the Buehners would not
acknowledge receipt, although he furnished the weigh
slips. (R. 300-319, A b . 38-39). ( I t was stipulated
t h a t the total tonnage delivered by plaintiff was 170
plus 89 or a total of 259 tons. (R. 318, A b . 3 9 ) . T h e
billing by plaintiff December 31, 1970, Exhibit 2 7 - P
(Ab. 118), was in error by reason of incorrect information given plaintiff by Clark T a n k Lines.
T h e court erroneously sustained objections to E x 56
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hibit 22-P, dated May 8, 1971, a letter from Paul E .
Reimann, counsel for plaintiff admittedly received by
Otto Buehner & Company; and also the belated letter
of response fro mThomas A. Duffin, Exhibit 23-P,
dated June 15, 1971, although Paul Buehner admitted
that someone else in the company authorized him to
write it. (R. 165-169, Ab. 22-23, 135-136). Counsel
for plaintiff received Exhibit 24-P prepared by Otto
Buehner & Company shortly prior to the time in 1971
when suit was filed. (Ab. 114). Defendants continued
to ignore plaintiff's demand for payment, but after
plaintiff's counsel sent Exhibit 22-P, the latter part of
June 1971 Otto Buehner & Company sent a check to
Brimhall for some "additional aggregate", thereby
acknowledging that the Buehners actually had obtained
materials in excess of 4,000 tons. Even if the Buehners
had met the first three conditions under which plaintiff
would forebear to sue (which the Buehners failed to
perform), the fourth condition was that all aggregate
taken in excess of 4,000 tons would be at the regular
price of $35 a ton.
Brimhall received a letter from Thomas A. Duffin dated June 17, 1971. Exhibit 34-P dated July 28,
1971, was Brimhall's respense, set out in full in Appendix B. By said letter Brimhall stated that "Purchase Order # U 09868, Job # 9-267 was for the job
I negotiated for. Approximately 4,000 ton for the
Church Office Building." Brimhall also stated that
" I told him [Paul Buehner] I had no authority to sell
or quote a price on material for any other job or jobs
and that he would have to negotiate with Mr. Don Reimann." Brimhall returned the check sent by Otto
Buehner & Co. (R. 291-298, Ab. 37, 125). Defendants
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did not see fit to tell plaintiff that they sent such a
check to Brimhall, apparently hoping to be able t o
compromise plaintiff by getting Brimhall t o accept it.
I t is significant that Brimhall testified t h a t he wrote
in longhand on his deposition:
" D o n Reimann told M r . P a u l Buehner t h a t
they could not have material for any other j o b
for the same price as the Church Office Building
order." (R. 615, A b . 8 9 ) .
Exhibit 19-P was issued solely in the name of
Brimhall, with all money payable to Brimhall, and with
all performance by Brimhall as "seller" t o be made by
Brimhall. Counsel for defendants at the trial distorted
the following provision of Exhibit 19-P argue t h a t it
entitled defendants t o get additional aggregate at
$20.50 a ton for other j o b s :
" I n the event additional material is needed
said D. W. Brimhall will furnish said quantities
of aggregates to Otto Buehner & Co. within 30
days of notice of same by O B C to Mr.
Brimhall,
his successors or assignees, and at the same price
as the original order and under said provisions
as to quality." (Italics a d d e d ) .
T h e above provision was doubtless copied from
other forms which are designed t o avoid leaving the
purchaser short on the particular type of material for
the Particular job quoted, and could only have referred
t o the Church Office Building j o b N o . 9-267 stated in
Exhibit 19-P, but even the court misconstrued it. I f
there were an ambituity or uncertainty, the document
would have t o be construed against the Buehners who
prepared it. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, etc.,
450 F . 2d 493.
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Otto Buehner & Company in its second claim in
its amended counterclaim acknowledged that the above
quoted provision only related to the Church job, for defendant falsely alleged that it needed some additional
material of designated sizes for the Church Office
Building job and notified American Aggregate and
Brimhall, but they "refused" to deliver it. (R. 715).
The Buehner company made the fictitious claim that it
was "damaged" $7,000 by having to crush larger sizes
of materials. Buehners knew they had contracted with
Clark Tank Lines to haul away 4,000 tons of plaintiff's
aggregate (Exhibit 5-D); that defendants had complete control of the hauling of the 4,000 tons; and that
the Buehner employees instructed the drivers what sizes
to haul. (R. 52-59, 63-66, 187, Ab. 7-9, 25). To illustrate the falsity of the claims and testimony of defendants, for over a year Buehners would not divulge
to plaintiff what the Buehners had obtained, but defendant Buehner company continued to help itself to
such sizes of aggregate as Buehners decided to take
away from plaintiff's quarry. At the trial it was admitted that the Buehners had changed the sizes of aggregate they decided to use. (R. 469-470, Ab. 65). By
its own neglect and bungling operations, Otto Buehner
& Company left at the quarry at least 200 tons of the
sizes it claimed it needed, and in consequence of which
it falsely claimed it had to crush 1,000 tons of jumbo
size. (R. 342, 497-502, Ab. 43, 71). To further illustrate the deceitful character of the defendants' evidence,
on cross-examination Marv Allred, plant superintendent, by his own admissions proved that the alleged
"shortage" of certain sizes was due to the fact that the
Buehners had diverted some materials from the Church
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job to an entirely unrelated job. (R. 485-485, 494-495,
Ab. 68-70). Exhibit 16-D shows that the total tonnage
used on the Church Office job was only 3,355 tons of
milk-white quartz aggregate. Marv Allred estimated
the tonnage was 3,500. (R. 494-495, Ab. 70).
Buehners also sought to exact another $7,000 by a
fourth claim by falsely asserting that plaintiff and
Brimhall delivered a lot of materials in excess of the
Brimhall purchase order; that defendant paid Clark
Tank Lines $7,000 for hauling such excess materials
(R. 716), when the Buehners knew they had contracted
the hauling away of those additional materials. The
Buehners tried to "add insult to injury" by urging in
court a fictitious claim that jilaintiff had "damaged"
defendant for the delivery charges of Clark Tank Lines
which the Buehners had secretly contracted. The fictitious claims of $14,000 for "damages" which Buehners
injected into the case, further discredit all of defendants' testimony in any possible conflict with plaintiff's
evidence.
I n addition to the other reversible errors hereinabove discussed, the trial court was misled into prejudicial error by defendants in paragraph 7 of the findings
of fact. Thereby the court condoned defendant's unlawful price-fixing of $20.50 per ton for 4,000 tons of
plaintiff's aggregate. That was below plaintiff's own
price quotations, and even below plaintiff's costs. Even
if plaintiff could have been pressured into consenting,
any such agreement would have been illegal and void
and unenforceable under the Unfair Practices Act and
Title 50, Chapter 1. Although Exhibit 19-P was made
by Brimhall and defendants adversely to plaintiff's
rights and interests, the court in effect made plaintiff
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a party thereto, in disregard of the Statute of Frauds
and the Parol Evidence Rule. The court without the
consent of plaintiff, contrary to law, further amended
the illegal purchase order to allow defendants to take
additional quantities of plaintiff's aggregate for other
jobs whenever they pleased, at defendants' illegally
dictated price-below-cost of $20.50 per ton, for the
eventual financial destruction of plaintiff as a competitor. The court utterly disregarded the fact that
defendants never complied with even one of the four
conditions specified by plaintiff to refrain from bringing suit. Notwithstanding plaintiff was put to substantial expense to obtain the information as to defendants'
overreaching and spurious damage claims, the court
even denied plaintiff interest.
The $17,132.85 purportedly "tendered into court"
at the end of the trial was not a valid tender, for it
was based on defendants' below cost illegal offer of
$20.50 a ton, and it could not be accepted under the
Unfair Practices Act, because it would be illegal to do
so. (R. 651, 658, Ab. 94-95). There was no tender or
deposit in court under Rule 67 or Rule 68, for no money
was deposited or placed under the control of the court.
Instead, a corporate check dated June 6, 1973, of Otto
Buehner & Company for that amount without interest
payable to D. W . Brimhall and American Aggregate
Company was left with the clerk. (Ab. 139). Defendants attempted to force plaintiff to bargain with Brimhall, and to cut off plaintiff's right of appeal, if
possible.
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CONCLUSION
Independent of all other evidence we believe defendants themselves proved their guilt of a conspiracy
to defraud plaintiff, a conspiracy for illegal price fixing in restraint of trade and commerce to the injury and
loss of plaintiff, illegal unfair competition and unfair
trade practices.
Paragraphs 1 and 6 of the judgment which erroneously dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice and
deny plaintiff costs, should be reversed and vacated.
Defendants never complied with any of the four conditions plaintiff named for refraining from suing
defendants.
Therefore, on its First Claim, since plaintiff's
quoted price was $29.50 per ton for selected sizes, and
defendants induced Brimhall to accept in his own name
Exhibit 19-P whereby Otto Buehner & Company was
to get plaintiff's aggregate at defendants' dictated
pirce of $20.50 per ton in violation of the Unfair Practices Act, Title 13, Chapter 5, and of the statute against
price fixing and restraint of trade, Title 50, Chapter 1,
the plaintiff is justly entitled to the difference of $9
per ton on 4,000 tons or $36,000 whereby defendants
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves. If treble
damages are not allowed under Title 50, Chapter 1,
punitive damages should be awarded inasmuch as
plaintiff was subjected to substantial loss of time and
attorney fees in investigations to extract the necessary
information and to obtain an adjudication.
On the Second Claim plaintiff is entitled to $35 a
ton for 259 tons or $9,065 principal. On the Third
Claim plaintiff is entitled to $35 a ton less the stipu62
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lated transportation cost of $7.55 per ton or $27.45 per
ton or $25,061.85. Plaintiff claims a right to interest
on all principal amounts from the dates of the taking
of plaintiff's aggregate.

PAUL ET^REIMANN
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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APPENDIX A
Excerpts from the Utah Unfair Practices Act,
Title 13, Chapter 5, U.C.A., 1953, deemed material
to this case:
13-5-17. Policy of act.—The legislature declares that the purpose of this act is to safeguard
the public against the creation and perpetuation
of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented. . . .
13-5-3. Unlawful discrimination.— (a) That
it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchasers involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are
sold for use, consumption or resale within the
State of Utah, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent
competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them; provided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery resulting from the different methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered;. . .
(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.
A-l
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13-5-6. Violations, agents liable with principal.
—Any person who either as director, officer or
agent of any firm or corporation or as agent of
any person, violating the provisions of this act,
assists or aids directly or indirectly, in such violation shall be responsible therefor equally with the
person, firm or corporation for whom or for
which he acts.
13-5-7. Sales, less than cost.— (a) It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to sell, or
sale of any merchandise, either by retailer or
wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this
act, with the intent and purpose of inducing the
purchase of other merchandise or otherwise injuring a competitor, impairs and prevents fair
competition, injures public welfare, and is unfair
competition contrary to public policy and the
policy of this act and is declared to be a violation of this act.
(b) 1. When used in this act, the term "cost"
as applied to production shall include the cost of
raw materials, labor, and all overhead expenses
of the producer.
13-5-13. Contracts in violation declared illegal.
—Any contract, expressed or implied, made by
any person, in violation of any of the provisions
of this act is declared to be an illegal contract
and no recovery thereon shall be had.
13-5-15. Penalty for violations of act.—Any
person, whether as principal, agent, officer or
director, for himself, or itself or for another person, who shall violate any of the provisions of
this act, is guilty of a misdemeanor for each
single violation. . . ." (Italics added).
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APPENDIX B
Exhibit 34-P
17 East 6150 South
Murray, Utah 84107
July 28, 1971
Cannon, Duffin and Howe
Attorneys at Lae
Dear Mr. Duff in:
In answer to your letter of June 17,1971.
The letter from Mr. Paul E. Reiman must not have
been included as it didn't accompany your letter.
You stated they are demanding $35.00 per ton, when
purchase order was for $20.50. Purchase Order # U
09868, Job # 9-267 was for the job I negotiated for.
Approximately 4,000 ton for the Church office building.
As to the material in question, I will state the proceedings as they occurred. Mr. Paul Buehner called me,
D. W . Brimhall, and said he would need possibly 700
tons for another job. I told him I had no authority to
sell or quote a price on material for any other job or
jobs and that he would have to negotiate with Mr. Don
Reiman.
After my conversation with Mr. Paul Buehner, I called
Mr. Don Reiman and informed him that Mr. Buehner
had called and would need possibly 700 tons for another job and that I had told Mr. Buehner to contact
him.
In regard to the check made out for the total. This
check was mailed to me and when I received it, I
called Mr. Paul Buehner and reminded him of the past
B-l
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discussions with him, and that I would return thecheck.
I gave instructions for the check to be returned and I
returned to my job in Manila, Utah. The check was
not mailed and we left for a month vacation. W e did
not return until July 25, when we received your letter.
The check is being returned today.
This matter, for whatever additional material was used,
will have to be worked out by Mr. Buehner and Mr.
Reiman.
If I can be of any further assistance, Please let me
know
Yours truly,
D. W. B R I M H A L L
cc: P . E . Reimann
cc. American Agg.
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